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Abstract
Economists often advise governments to target their spending better when cuts are called for.
This paper asks whether that advice is consistent with a political-economy constraint that limits
the welfare losses to the non-poor from spending cuts. A simple theoretical model shows that the
answer is unclear on a priori grounds, and so will depend on the specifics of program design and
financing. A case study for a World Bank-supported social program in Argentina illustrates how
cuts can come with worse targeting performance; the allocation to the poor falls faster than that
to the non-poor.  Some lessons are drawn for how the poor might be better protected from cuts.
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The impact  on the poor of cuts in public  spending  has been of widespread  concern. It is often
recommended  that cuts should  be combined  with better  targeting,  so the poor do not suffer. If
there is a broad political  constituency  in support  of protecting  the poor from cuts then the task
should  not be too difficult. But is it possible  to target  more, while spending  less,  when the
political support  of the non-poor  is crucial,  and cannot  be counted  on?
It is common  to find benefit  "leakage"  to the non-poor  from programs  ostensibly  targeted
to the poor. This suggests  scope  for finer targeting. However,  a degree  of leakage  may  well be
crucial  to the political  sustainability  of social  programs  (Gelbach  and Pritchett, 1997;  de Donder
and Hindriks,  1998).  By the same  token, the feasibility  of combining  cuts with better  targeting  is
unclear on a priori grounds  given  that the non-poor  may also  have the power  to protect
themselves  from the welfare  burden of spending  cuts. While  there have certainly  been cases  in
which  cuts were combined  with better  targeting,  possibly  these were all situations  in which  the
political  economy  constraint  was not binding.
Nor does the (limited)  evidence  available  support  a presumption  that targeting  tends to
worsen  with program  expansion,  or improve  with cuts. For example,  comparisons  of the
regional  differences  in participation  rates  in various social  programs  in India suggest  that it is the
non-poor  who capture  the early benefits,  with larger marginal  gains  to the poor only emerging
later on (Lanjouw  and Ravallion,  1999). The benefit-incidence  studies  I know of that have
tracked  changes  in incidence  over time have found improvements  in targeting  with program
expansion (Hammer et al., 1995; van de Walle, 1995).
To investigate  this issue, the paper begins  with a simple  model  of the political-economy
of spending  cuts (section  2). The model  identifies  conditions  under  which  the poor will lose from
2cuts that are constrained to have limited welfare impacts on the non-poor.  After describing how
targeting performance is to be measured (section 3), the paper presents evidence on how cuts to a
social program in Argentina affected its performance in targeting the poor (section 4).  The
concluding section summarizes the results, and discusses possible implications for efforts to
protect the poor from public spending retrenchment.
2.  Targeting and Spending Cuts
The model is as follows. There is initially some allocation of program spending between given
numbers of "poor" and "non-poor" people. Spending on each poor person is  O 7  and it is Ga for
the non-poor.  Aggregate program spending per capita is:
6=  GVH+  GZ'(I - IV)  (1)
where His  the proportion of the population that is poor.  The allocation a",  Gryields  a benefit
to each non-poor household of 3(6,  6G).  The Bfunction is smoothly increasing in both
arguments with first derivatives  8,,, which I call the "direct marginal benefit", and  ,, the
"indirect marginal benefit"; the latter allows for interdependence, in that the non-poor can gain
(indirectly) from spending on the poor. The cost of the program to each non-poor person is
C(6).  (This includes the taxes or fees for financing the program plus efficiency losses from
raising the revenue.)  The function Cis assumed to be smoothly increasing.  So the net gain to
the non-poor from the program is 3(6',  Gl)  - C((6). However,  C7is assumed to be an adequate
measure of the gain to the poor. The allocation is assumed to be efficient in that any re-allocation
of the budget would hurt one of the two groups. For this to be the case, a reallocation from each
poor person to each non-poor person - holding total spending constant - must benefit the non-
poor on balance. This implies that  g A>  8(1-  h'.
3Total spending is now to be cut, and the non-poor have the power to block any proposal
that makes them worse off.  So B(G,  GC)  - C(6)  is to be held constant.  This constraint, and
equation (1), then determine how the aggregate budget cut is distributed between the poor and
non-poor.  Let  GI(6 Y) and G(G)  be the allocations from the total outlay, 6, consistent with the
political-economy constraint.
The targeting performance of the program is measured by the absolute difference in the
benefits going to the poor versus the non-poor.  Let this difference be
_7  6)  ... 6`0  ( 6) - G"  ( 6)  (2)
which I will call the "targeting differential"; the benchmark of a uniform allocation (with equal
outlays per capita to the two groups) is deemed to be "untargeted".
Under the political economy constraint, the effect of a change in total spending on the
targeting differential is given by:
7C  "  +1  ,  Co  (3)
This has the sign of . + B  - C.,  given that the allocation is efficient. If the marginal cost to the
non-poor is zero then targeting will deteriorate with cuts, and improve with higher outlays. This
is intuitive; a low marginal cost will mean that the cuts do not entail much saving to the non-
poor, who will then require a larger slice of the program benefits to compensate.
The above analysis relies heavily on a binding political-economy constraint preventing
the cuts from reducing the welfare of the non-poor.  Alternatively, one can consider the
allocation that maximizes A(G,  C)  + e0"  (for some  e?  O)at given 6, and ask how this
allocation varies with 6C Assuming that A(G6, G') is strictly quasi-concave, there will be
interior solutions for Cl and  G6 as functions of a  However, the effect on the targeting
4differential is also ambiguous in this case. For example, if B9= G7  + /(6G)  (for some strictly
increasing concave function h) then the poor are fully protected from cuts ( 60a  = 0) and
l6. =  -1 /(I - H) < 0;  by contrast, if B=  Z(C)  + Cr?  then the allocation to the non-poor is fully
protected ( 6 6 = 0 ) and so F. = 1/ H >  0 .
The main task of the empirical work will be to estimate the effect of changes in total
spending on a measure of targeting performance motivated by the above discussion.
3.  Measuring Targeting Performance
To identify the effects of program cuts on targeting performance we need a consistent measure of
performance observed over various levels of program spending, with suitable controls for other
incidental factors influencing performance. I will focus on a central government anti-poverty
program for which the job of making spending allocations is decentralized to provincial
governments. Each provincial government allocates its budget across the local government areas
("departments") within its boundaries.
The measure of targeting performance I will use is the province-specific regression
coefficient of the inter-departmental budget allocation on a (pre-determined) measure of poverty
by department.2 This regression coefficient can be interpreted as an estimate of the targeting
differential defined in the last section. That interpretation rests on an assumption about the
behavior of provincial governments.  It is assumed that a province's preferred allocation to a
household depends on that household's level of poverty, but that it does not depend on the level
of poverty in the household's department of residence independently of that. (The household's
own poverty may nonetheless depend on where it lives.) The actual amount received by a
5household can deviate from the province's optimal allocation; but the deviation is independent of
the level of poverty in the area of residence.  This assumption assures that there is horizontal
equity in expectation within a given province, in that a person living in a poor department
expects to get the same amount from the program as an equally poor person living in a rich area
within the same province. 3
To see the implications of this assumption for measuring targeting performance, consider
again the model of section 2, which is now interpreted as applying to each of the provincial
governments. The central government allocates a total budget of Gper head of  across the ff
provinces such that §.is  received by provincej(=l,  .., M.  Then each province decides how
much of its budget should go to the poor versus the non-poor.  The chosen allocation by province
jis  G6  per capita for the non-poor and 6'  for the poor. Provincejcomprises  A!)  departments.
The per capita allocations to department  e  (1,..,  l)) within province  jcan  be written as:
6)=  61 +e;  (4)
X=  G0 + Ly  (5)
where the e's are the departmental deviations from the province means.
Total disbursements to the poor and non-poor must exhaust the budget. This creates an
accounting identity linking total program expenditure per capita to the poverty rate in a
department. Let G, denote total spending in the /th  department of thejth  province, and let the
corresponding poverty rate be H. for which the province mean is H, Then:
G,j  = jY,/G: + (I  (6)
2  The  method  follows  Ravallion  (1999)  which  also goes  into  further  detail  on the properties  of the
estimated  targeting  differential.
There  may,  however,  be horizontal  inequity  between  provinces;  Ravallion  (1999a)  discusses  this
point  further  and provides  evidence  for the  Argentinean  program  discussed  below.
6Using equations (4) and (5), we can re-write (6) in the form of a simple linear regression:
G,j  - 6j  =-:  ,(X  -f/  +  v,j  (7)
where
Vj..£,+  (y,  )j(8)
and 73  ...  .C  -G  is the targeting differential for provincei.  Under the assumption of intra-
provincial horizontal equity, v,, will have zero mean for a given province and be uncorrelated
with hj, (since the L's are zero-mean errors within any given province and are uncorrelated with
both h,  and its squared value). 4 Thus h, is exogenous in (7) and so one can estimate F. from an
OLS regression of 6, on hfj across all departments within a given province. 5 This will then be
measured before and after cuts to the program, which differ across provinces.
4.  Tests of the Effects of Cuts on Targeting
Argentina's  Trabajar program was introduced in response to a sharp increase in unemployment
in 1996-97. The program provides short-term work at relatively low wages on community-level
projects. 6 (Examples of funded sub-projects include pre-schools, health-posts, drainage and
sanitation infrastructure, water tanks, local roads and public parks.)
The central government allocates its budget across provinces, based in large part on the
expected incidence of unemployment amongst the poor (based on an urban labor force survey;
differences in the poverty rate in rural areas were also considered). The center's disbursements
4  Note that the horizontal  equity  assumption  rules  out effects  of the  program  on migration  within
provinces.  If there is no difference  in expected  allocations  for otherwise  identical  households  then  they
will have  no incentive  to move.
5  Equation  (8) indicates  that the error  term will  not be homoskedastic  although  this can be dealt
with in estimating  the standard  error of the targeting  differential.  All t-ratios  quoted  below  are  based on
standard  errors  corrected  for heteroscedasticity.
7can only be made against outlays on wages, paid up to an agreed maximum equal to the
minimum wage rate.  The provincial or municipal government (or, in about 15% of sub-projects,
a bona fide non-governmental organization) must secure financing for the rest.
The sub-projects must be technically viable. Amongst those proposals that are deemed
viable, priority is given to those that are likely to be of value to poor communities, as indicated
by their location, the type of project, its labor-intensity, the desire to undercut the maximum
wage rate, and prior success of the local sponsoring agency in completing any past projects.  This
prioritization is implemented through an ex-ante appraisal that assigns points to each technically
viable project proposal, and proposals with highest points are funded first within each province.
Within the constraints set by the center's rules (summarized above), the provincial
project offices have considerable influence over how the money is allocated within the province.
Local communities within a province can differ greatly in their ability to propose and co-finance
viable sub-projects. Better off areas undoubtedly have a comparative advantage in this respect,
both in assuring that the project proposal is technically viable and financing the non-wage costs.
Interviews with numerous provincial staff (in five provinces during 1997-98) suggested that the
efforts of provincial managers to get good projects from poor areas within their province are
likely to be crucial in determining overall targeting performance. Active involvement of the
provincial office can help greatly in generating project proposals from poor areas, and assuring
that they are technically viable.  It can then help in securing funding for the non-wage costs from
other (national and provincial) government programs. It is clear that in some provinces the local
managers are professional technocrats who aim to implement the program's  objectives in an
6  Hereafter,  when  I refer  to "Trabajar",  I mean  the program  called  Trabajar  II in Argentina.  For
further  discussion  of the differences  between  Trabajar  I and II see Ravallion  (1999).
8efficient way. In other provinces, however, they are more heavily swayed by national or local
politics in deciding which areas should get most attention from the program.
Disbursements began in May 1997. There appears to have been a large pent-up demand
for work on the program, due to the high level of unemployment at the time.  The coming
elections (in October 1997) also encouraged high program spending in the first five months.  The
center imposed a sharp contraction in program spending after this initial period. Average
program spending was $6.37 per capita between May and September 1997 (inclusive); this fell to
$2.58 per capita in the following five months (October 1997 to February 1998). Spending then
rebounded slightly to $3.05 per capita in the final five months (March 1998 to July 1998).
The cuts were not uniform across provinces. There were unexpected differences in the
extent of the local unemployment problem (expected differences were reflected in the center's
initial budget allocation across provinces). There were also differences between provinces in the
extent to which the program was needed to help win votes in the months leading up the October
1997 elections. These factors meant that the cuts varied greatly across provinces; the percentage
fall in spending per capita between the first five months and the second five months ranged from
25% to 62%. The rest of this section will examine what happened to the program's targeting
performance after these cuts.
Following the approach outlined in section 3, the spatial variances at the level below the
province can be exploited to identify a measure of targeting performance appropriate to this
program. I will use data for 503 departments across 22 provinces. A poverty measure is available
at department level, namely the percentage of households deemed to have one or more "unmet
basic needs" (UWA)  based on the 1991 census; the list of "basic needs" include adequate
9housing, sanitation, and education. 7 Since it is based on the census, the Us9index  covers the
whole population, and so is representative at a high level of geographic dissaggregation. The
index is the only systematic poverty data at department level available to provincial offices in
setting priorities for Trabajar sub-projects. The index is somewhat out of date (5-6 years prior to
the Trabajar program), although this means that it can be safely treated as exogenous. The
composition and weighting of the component indicators is not beyond question. Nonetheless, the
8AAi1ndex  is the best information available for the present purpose. The average &ffiVindex
across the 22 provinces is 22.5%.
To estimate the targeting differential for each province I regress Trabajar spending per
capita on the &URAIindex  across departments, as in equation (7). To test the effect of budget
contraction on targeting performance, I divide the whole period of the program's operation into
three intervals of five months. The first period (May-September 1997) saw quite good targeting
in many of the provinces, but the gains dissipated in the second period. The overall targeting
differential (across all 503 departments) was $72 per person (t8.54)  in the first five month
period, falling to $15 (t=10.57) in the second period, and recovering slightly in the third period to
a value of $23 (t-10.3 1). (Recall that the targeting differentials are interpreted as the difference
between the per capita disbursement going to the poor versus non-poor.) A statistical addendum
is available with detailed results on spending and the targeting differentials by province and
period.
To identify the effect of spending cuts on targeting performance, we can now estimate an
empirical model of the 7(6) function defined in section 2. To do this I regress the province and
A household  is deemed  to have  unsatisfied  basic  needs  if there are more  than  three people  per
room,  or the housing  is sub-standard  (unsafe,  for example),  or it does  not have  a toilet  or bathroom,  or if
there is any school-age  child  not attending  school,  or more  than  four people  are working  and the
household  head  has little  or no education.
10period-specific targeting differentials on program spending per capita across provinces, pooling
all three periods and all provinces. The targeting differential will, however, vary across
provinces according to other factors. Examples include the strength of provincial concern for
poverty reduction, how poor the province is as a whole, its aggregate budget allocation (over all
three periods), the history of the provincial efforts at targeting the poor, and the capabilities of
local managers. It is not implausible that some or all of these variables will also be correlated
with program spending. So their omission will yield a biased estimate of the effect of cuts on
targeting performance. However, these differences in provincial targeting performance can
reasonably be treated as provincial fixed effects when estimating the impact of changes in
program spending.
Combining these observations, the empirical model of the  l7(G) function takes the form:
i,,  a +aG,z+  9 / +i  ,,  (,/1,..,22;  i1,2,3)  (9)
where c is the province-specific effect andi is an innovation error. (I also tested for non-linearity
in this relationship by adding a squared term in program spending per capita but this was
insignificant.)
The estimate of &&  in equation (9) was 3.55 (with a t-ratio of 5.32); a $1 cut in average
spending reduced the targeting differential by $3.55 on average. The estimated province effects
(the El's)  were jointly significant at the 5% level, and individually significant in about half the
provinces.  (The statistical addendum gives full details by province.)
There are clearly strong inter-provincial differences in targeting performance not
accountable to differences in budget allocations from the center. And these province effects are
correlated with program spending. Dropping the province effects from equation (9), the estimate
11of  falls to 2.23 (t=2. 17) indicating a tendency for lower program spending in provinces with
better targeting performance (conditional on program spending).
One factor in this negative correlation between program spending and targeting
performance at a given level of spending is how poor the province is. Across provinces, there is
a strong positive correlation between the URAI-index  and average program spending (a
correlation coefficient of 0.76). There is only a mild negative correlation between the province
fixed effects in equation (9) and the UBN index (-0.28). However, a significant partial
correlation emerges if one controls for an indicator of the province's latent preference for
poverty reduction, namely the targeting differential under a workfare program that preceded
Trabajar (Ravallion, 1999a). 8
So poorer provinces tend to be less effective in reaching their poor at any given budget
allocation from the center; but at the same time they tend to attract higher allocations from the
center. Elsewhere I have offered a theoretical model that can explain this finding, and discussed
its potential implications for central disbursements (Ravallion, 1999b).
Figure I plots the targeting differential against spending per capita; to control for the
province effects, I have used the estimate of equation (9) to predict the targeting differential for a
reference province chosen to be one with a targeting differential close to the overall mean.
So the cuts to this program came with worse, not better, targeting perfornance.  The
expected program allocations to the poor fell by more than did those to the non-poor. My casual
discussions with provincial project managers suggested that it was politically difficult to assure
that the cuts came only from non-poor areas. This reflected (in part) the fact that the program
8  On regressing  the province  fixed  effect  (from  the  estimate  of equation  (9)) on the &Z'iVindex  and
the targeting  differential  for the Trabajar  I program,  one obtains  a regression  coefficient  of -0.019
(t=2.46)  on the (&mAindex  and  0.459  (t=3.64)  on the Trabajar  I targeting  differential.  The  P7  is 0.459.
12was already favoring poor areas, and so there was little slack for cutting heavily elsewhere while
still leaving sufficiently broad participation.
Drawing on the model in section 2, there was little obvious saving, via project financing,
to non-poor areas from the cuts.  The program had negligible cost-recovery from non-poor areas,
even for sub-projects in those areas. Low cost-recovery (at the margin) of program benefits in
non-poor areas left the poor more exposed to cuts. Also it is not implausible that marginal
benefits to the non-poor were quite high; the initially high degree of targeting implied low
allocations to non-poor areas and so probably high marginal benefits.  The fact that the program
provided work to poor neighbors in non-poor areas presumably also entailed indirect benefits to
the non-poor.  Unless the sub-projects in non-poor areas were protected from cuts, there would
have had to be a welfare loss to the non-poor.
5.  Conclusions
To the extent that the poor are the intended beneficiaries, benefits to the non-poor from a social
program are commonly seen as "leakage" from "mis-targeting". It is widely recognized that
such leakage may sometimes be essential for the political sustainability of a program.  The same
circumstances that require leakage to the non-poor for sustainability will presumably act to
restrict the welfare losses to the non-poor from cuts. Does this throw serious doubt on the
internal consistency of policy recommendations for combining cuts with better targeting?
Under certain conditions, the poor can be protected from cuts to a social program even
when a political-economy constraint entails that there can be no welfare loss to the non-poor. It
will be easier to protect the poor from cuts when the programs concerned entail low marginal
benefits and/or high marginal costs to the non-poor. For example, if the method of financing
imposes a sufficiently high marginal cost on the non-poor of program expansion then targeting
13will improve with cuts. The savings to the non-poor on the financing side will mean that they are
more willing to accept a reallocation of outlays in favor of the poor.
These conditions clearly did not hold in the case of the social program in Argentina
studied in this paper. I have compared targeting performance across provinces before and after
province-specific cuts. The results indicate that the program's performance in reaching the poor
deteriorated sharply with cuts to the program's aggregate budget.
Whether these conditions hold for other programs is an open question. The answer will
depend on the institutional setting and program design, as these features will determine the
marginal costs and benefits to the non-poor from cuts.  These contingencies would appear to
create some scope for reforms to program design and financing that can help protect the poor
from future cuts. However, one must be careful that such reforms do not unduly jeopardize other
program objectives. For example, one could lower marginal benefits from leakage to the non-
poor at the expense of infra-marginal targeting. That route would of course have ambiguous
impacts on the poor; they would be better protected from cuts, but their initial share of program
benefits would be lower.
14Figure 1: Targeting  Performance  and Program  Spending
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with controls  for latent  province  heterogeneity  (reference  is Mendoza)
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16ADDENDUM
Table 1: Targeting Performance and Program Spending
Province  Targeting differential (/100)  Spending per capita
5/1997-  10/1997-  3/1998-  5/1997-  10/1997-  3/1998-
9/1997  2/1998  7/1998  9/1997  2/1998  7/1998
Buenos Aires  -0.028  -0.154*  -0.078  1.09  0.92  1.51
Catamarca  0.339  0.116  0.307  14.24  3.76  4.06
Chaco  0.193  0.027  0.182  17.79  5.16  7.09
Chubut  0.331  0.454  0.182  5.67  2.69  4.83
Cordoba  1.435*  0.969*  1.593*  4.44  2.82  2.38
Corrientes  0.676*  -0.003  0.048  14.81  2.30  3.38
Entre Rios  0.312  -0.006  0.260  7.43  4.13  3.92
Formosa  0.079  0.185*  0.067  13.36  4.19  5.22
Jujuy  0.932*  0.271  0.342  18.96  5.20  6.58
La Pampa  0.278*  0.175*  -0.060  8.54  4.20  6.20
La Rioja  -0.075  -0.013  0.224  15.13  2.55  4.00
Mendoza  0.640*  0.044  0.435*  5.89  1.56  2.23
Misiones  -0.142  -0.088  -0.085  12.05  6.07  5.56
Neuquen  -0.043  -0.114  0.126  12.11  5.83  7.68
RioNegro  0.601*  0.251  1.032*  8.90  4.58  5.51
Salta  0.944*  0.395*  0.766*  13.07  3.78  4.55
SanJuan  0.920*  0.631*  0.457*  8.92  3.35  2.79
SanLuis  0.785  0.031  0.312*  16.66  2.47  3.53
Santa Cruz  0.393  -0.233  0.083  5.69  2.87  4.05
Santa Fe  0.567*  0.257*  0.199*  7.95  4.46  4.01
Santiago Del Estero  0.883*  -0.066  0.038  21.38  4.07  3.96
Tucuman  1.122*  0.386*  0.471*  13.65  4.58  5.46
All departments  0.716*  0.153*  0.229*  6.37  2.58  3.05
Note: The targeting differentials are given by the regression coefficient  of program spending per capita on
the poverty rate, across all departments in each province; * indicates  that the coefficient is significantly
different from zero at the 5% level based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors.
17Table 2: Testing the Effects of Program Cuts on Targeting Performance
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic  Prob.
Program spending  0.0355  5.3163  0.000
-Pro  Pince  fixe  eJfferxs
Buenos Aires  -0.1284  -3.5702  0.001
Catamarca  -0.0073  -0.0692  0.945
Chaco  -0.2218  -1.8392  0.073
Chubut  0.1661  1.5324  0.133
Cordoba  1.2181  6.3683  0.000
Corrientes  -0.0024  -0.0281  0.977
Entre Rios  0.0053  0.0585  0.954
Formosa  -0.1594  -1.2032  0.236
Jujuy  0.1509  1.8067  0.078
LaPampa  -0.0933  -0.8864  0.380
La Rioja  -0.2115  -1.0575  0.296
Mendoza  0.2583  1.8397  0.073
Misiones  -0.3855  -3.7157  0.001
Neuquen  -0.3138  -2.8867  0.006
Rio Negro  0.4031  1.7214  0.092
Salta  0.4482  3.8180  0.000
San  Juan  0.4909  6.1743  0.000
San Luis  0.1076  1.0678  0.292
Santa  Cruz  -0.0684  -0.4381  0.664
Santa  Fe  0.1465  1.8623  0.069
Santiago  Del Estero  -0.0634  -0.5862  0.561
Tucuman  0.3791  2.8276  0.007
R-squared  0.8129
S.E. of regression  0.2094
Mean dependent  variable  0.3266
Log likelihood  23.6800
F-statistic  8.4932
Note: Dependent  variable  is the targeting  differential  (/100). White  heteroskedasticity-
consistent  standard  errors.
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